Ho Chi Minh	Vo Ngyyen Giap
Le Duc Tho	Pham Van Dong

In the year preceeding the beginning of this simulation, the government of North Vietnam had launched a new policy based on a strategic gamble. Their hope was to capitalize on the weakness in South Vietnam following the overthrow of President Diem and make what they expected would be the final push to gain military control of the South. They wanted to achieve this without provoking a major U.S. intervention or, at worst, before the U.S. could counter their efforts. In December 1963, the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party made the decision to escalate their efforts in supporting the revolution in the South. The possibility of sending regular NVA troops into combat in the South was hotly debated but the decision was not to take this step. The escalation of the war was a significant gamble. It risked bringing the United States into the war in a much more intense manner; it exacerbated tensions with the Soviet Union, who feared a wider war; and it meant a further shift toward the Chinese. The U.S. reaction to the escalation was the greatest unknown, and the greatest risk. The leaders of the DRV based their decision on the judgment that the increased efforts would lead to a quick crumbling of the Saigon regime, which would force the U.S. to accept a political settlement favorable to Hanoi. They discounted the chances of a rapid U.S. buildup to meet the challenge. The escalation gamble was based on a reasonably accurate estimate of the situation in the South and events over the next year would demonstrate a steady erosion of South Vietnamese military capability. By the end of 1964, more than one-half of the land area and population of the South was under the control of Communists forces. The Saigon Government was in desperate turmoil, with repeated coups, counter-coups, and threatened coups. The political conflict between Catholics and Buddhists had even become violent in Saigon. It was in their estimate of the United States where the DRV had the most difficulty. On several occasions during 1964, the United States had sent warnings to Hanoi not to persist in its present policy and escalate its role in the war. These warnings were largely ignored and in one case provoked a defiant statement that the North Vietnamese were prepared to win at any cost. At some point following the Tonkin Gulf incident and the air attacks on the DRV, a decision was reached to begin sending regular NVA forces to the South, in conjunction with an increased effort by the NLF. At the end of 1964 the NLF was prepared to attack American forces directly, at the Bien Hoa air base and an officers' billet in Saigon. Leaders in Hanoi anticipated a rapid collapse of the Government and military capabilities in the South. Preparation for this role involves reading the material from Duiker, pp. 164-184. The following article will help you understand some of the calculations of the North Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 , by O A Westad Also, you need to examine the following documents: MAO ZEDONG AND PHAM VAN DONG, HOANG VAN HOAN meeting in Beijing, 5 October 1964, 7-7:50 (p.m.?) ZHOU ENLAI AND HO CHI MINH, meeting in Hanoi, 1 March 1965 LIU SHAOQI AND LE DUAN, meeting in Beijing, 8 April 1965 Vietnam's Four Points, April 13, 1965 MAO ZEDONG AND HO CHI MINH meeting in Changsha (Hunan), 16 May 1965 ZHOU ENLAI AND NGUYEN VAN HIEU, NGUYEN THI BINH, meeting in Beijing (The Great Hall of the People), 16 May 1965 MAO ZEDONG AND HOANG VAN HOAN, meeting in Beijing, 16 July 1965 ZHOU ENLAI AND PHAM VAN DONG meeting in Beijing, 4 p.m. 9 October 1965 Le Duan, The Hanoi Politburo's letter to the Communist Party in the South, outlining the Party's commitment to a protracted war strategy CHEN YI AND NGUYEN DUY TRINH meeting in Beijing, 17 December 1965 ZHOU ENLAI AND NGUYEN DUY TRINH, meeting in Beijing, 10:30 a.m., 19 December 1965 ZHOU ENLAI, DENG XIAOPING, KANG SHENG AND LE DUAN, NGUYEN DUY TRINH meeting in Beijing, 13 April 1966

Here are some questions to consider: 1) How does the DRV define its national interests with regard to the southern half of Vietnam? Why does it care who rules there? What are the consequences to the DRV leadership of leaving the south in the hands of a government almost totally dependent on the U.S.? 2) The United States wants to think of the south as a separate nation and of the DRV as a foreign power in the south. That is, northern Vietnamese do not have a right to be in the south. How do you suppose DRV leaders would react to that idea? 3) What kinds of risks were the DRV leaders prepared to take in order to achieve victory? Does this level of risk-taking affect the reactions of the United States?

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